December 17, 1982

Task IV

U.S. POLICY: POSSIBLE ACTIONS/INITIATIVES

The interagency response to NSSD 11-82 establishes the framework for U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union over the next 5-10 years. The questions this section addresses is what we can do concretely over the next 6-24 months to implement the longer-term policies set forth in the NSSD study. Possible actions and initiatives fall into three broad categories: (1) general steps we should take to head off new instances of Soviet misconduct; (2) specific steps we might take in functional and geopolitical arenas where our interests conflict with Moscow's; and (3) specific steps we might take in the US-Soviet bilateral relationship.

I. General steps we should take to head off new instances of Soviet misconduct.

The new leadership will continue to exhibit considerable caution in situations which might involve direct confrontation with the United States, and Moscow will also be wary of foreign adventures which could undercut the effectiveness of its global "peace offensive." However, as the analysis earlier in this study suggests, we need to be prepared for increased tactical flexibility in Soviet foreign policy which could present us with new challenges. Moreover, unpredictable events, particularly in the developing world, could present Moscow with attractive opportunities to undercut U.S. interests. In such circumstances, the Soviets might well be tempted to act opportunistically in ways that would require a strong U.S. response.

We should consider what the U.S. should do to head off Soviet actions which might range from support for terrorism (Red Army), to increased support for insurgencies (El Salvador, Namibia), to political/military moves (raising fear level in Europe, Cuban troops into Nicaragua, stepped up military pressure on Pakistan), to the contingency of actual use of Soviet or proxy forces in a major military move (Somalia). Clearly each potential situation deserves detailed individual consideration that is beyond the scope of this paper. But we can take general steps in several areas.

A. Intelligence. We need the best possible intelligence collection and assessment efforts in areas where the Soviets might move, such as delivery of MiGs to Nicaragua. Unless we know in advance, we will be unable to warn the Soviets against such moves or take timely steps to counter them. We could then be faced with the much more difficult choice of either accepting a fait accompli or undertaking a costly and dangerous effort to reverse the Soviet/proxy action.

B. Warnings: With advance knowledge, we can and should issue appropriate warnings to the Soviets. At the same time, we should not warn the Soviets lightly, nor do we believe that there is anything to be gained by looking for an early opportunity to "warn" the Soviets against some action simply as a way of signalling our resolve. We should warn the Soviets only when we have reason to suspect that they may be preparing to take some specific unacceptable action and then only if we are prepared to act in defense of our interests if the warning is ignored. If warnings are to serve a useful purpose, they should be delivered early enough in an emerging situation so that Soviet prestige would not be damaged by compliance with our warning. While it may on some occasions be necessary to issue a public warning, such messages should whenever possible be delivered privately and through established diplomatic channels.

C. Reciprocity: One reason our warnings may have had some success to date in persuading the Soviets not to transfer MiGs to Nicaragua is that Moscow judged that this Administration had the will and capability to back up our warnings and/or to reciprocate in other areas. While we cannot be certain of the weight of our warnings in Soviet calculations, this underlines the importance of sustaining our own programs to help national liberation struggles in certain countries, and keeping in good repair the relations with third countries we need to do that. We should also be prepared to increase these efforts in ways that will be readily discernible to the Soviets if warranted by the situation on the ground or by the overall pattern of Soviet conduct.

D. Preemption/Reaction: We need to continue developing our military and covert action capabilities for preemption/reaction, including the RDJTF. And we should press our Allies to do more in preparing for contingencies beyond the NATO area.

E. Dialogue: One idea which needs further development is the possibility of a dialogue with the Soviet Union about the use of force versus peaceful settlement in areas of instability. We are now in a stronger position to discuss this than in the 1970s because we are hurting the Soviets and their clients in

various areas, even as they continue to hurt us. Clearly we do not want another set of principles which the Soviets proceed to ignore. Nor at the other extreme can we engage in specific trade-offs or discussions of spheres of influence, e.g. abandoning Afghanistan if they get out of Nicaragua. But there may be considerable room between these extremes for US-Soviet contacts to clarify our interests and initiatives in certain regions and even to explore whether there may be cases where Soviet and U.S. policies need not work at cross purposes.

F. Removing the Temptation: In a broader sense, one of the key elements is to prevent the emergence of situations in third areas which invite Soviet indirect or direct intervention. The Middle East, Africa, Southwest Asia, and Yugoslavia are good examples. In the case of the Middle East, the key is discernible progress on solutions of the political problems which provide the Soviet Union with entrée to the region. In the case of Yugoslavia, U.S. policy must place high priority on helping to ease Yugoslav economic problems to prevent Soviet meddling or pressure on the GOY. In the case of Africa, one way to help contain the development of domestic instability within which Soviet-backed insurgents can thrive is the maintenance of adequate levels of external financing for economic development as well as adequate security assistance. We should, however, be wary of making additional assistance commitments that will be difficult to fund. The appropriate means will vary from case to case, but the overall U.S. objective should be to shape the Soviet geopolitical environment so that it is less susceptible to manipulation by Moscow.

G. Individual Game Plans: All of this suggests that, as we develop individual policies for areas which have been identified above as most likely for Soviet action, we need to keep in mind this potential for greater Soviet activism. Our strategies should incorporate all of the elements listed above (warnings, reciprocity, etc.), plus the traditional diplomatic use of Allies, the U.N. etc. As we deal with individual problem areas around the world, we must not assume that the new Soviet leadership is so preoccupied at home that it cannot cause us new troubles. We should consider establishing special informal interagency working groups which could monitor particular situations and provide timely early warning of possible Soviet moves.

II. Specific Steps we Might Take in Functional and Geopolitical Arenas

A. Under the category of sustaining leverage and/or turning up the heat, there are these key areas for action:

1. Sustaining the momentum of our rearmament program. Maintaining steady, long-term growth in U.S. defense spending and capabilities -- both nuclear and conventional -- remains the most important way of conveying to the Soviets U.S. resolve and political staying-power. In this connection, the Soviets will be closely watching the development of our domestic debate on defense and arms control issues, and specifically the fate of MX, as barometers of our ability to follow through on the President's rearmament program. Of equal importance is the successful beginning of U.S. INF deployments in Europe in 1983. If we cannot obtain an acceptable INF agreement with Moscow, it may be necessary during 1983 to subordinate some other policy initiatives with the Allies to the overriding objective of moving forward with INF deployments.

2. East-West Economic Policy. As NSSD 11-82 points out, one key to our success in dealing with the Soviets and bringing about long-term change in the Soviet system is a united, firm Western approach to economic relations with the Soviets. We need to finish the first phase of the Western effort to define such a policy by the Williamsburg summit, i.e., six-months from now. It will take additional time to have specific agreement and teeth for each component: credits, COCOM, energy, etc. What this means for our overall approach to US-Soviet relations in the two year time-frame of this study is that we can move in the right direction, but slowly and with some predictable bumps. We need to take this into account as we examine other areas of the US-Soviet relationship, i.e., our economic leverage will be growing but still limited and fragile. We need to avoid moves which could ease pressure on the Allies for a tougher economic policy, e.g., overly positive atmospherics. Equally important we need to sustain Allied consensus, not pushing them on specific near-term problems so hard that we kill the overall exercise.

3. US-China relations. We need to provide sufficient content to the US-China relationship to sustain this key factor in our relations vis-a-vis the Soviets. To accomplish this, we will need to proceed calmly to develop US-China relations on their own merits, in a manner that will avoid giving either the Chinese or the Soviets the impression they can manipulate us.

The series of high level US-China exchanges already planned for 1983 will be key to advancing the relationship. The aim of the Secretary's February trip to China -- the first in the series -- will be to restore an atmosphere of trust and confidence. We have already made clear to the Chinese, and have received positive responses from them, that we expect the visit to include detailed exchanges of view in areas of common interest, regionally and globally.

In the Soviet context, we need to focus more closely on ensuring that any agreement the Chinese reach with the Soviets accords with our own interests. As the US-Chinese dialogue resumes, we should seek to engage the Chinese in discussions on how to prevent the Soviets from taking advantage of any reduction in Sino-Soviet tensions in a way that would be damaging to either of our interests. For example, any Sino-Soviet agreement to reduce troop levels along the border which allowed the Soviets to redeploy southwest (e.g., Afghanistan) would be damaging to both U.S. and Chinese interests.

It is also in both of our interests to avoid increasing the burden on NATO forces. Therefore, we should seek to use our dialogue with the Chinese to encourage them to seek demobilization, rather than redeployment, as appropriate drawing a careful parallel with our INF position. We should also maintain close dialogue on Afghanistan; and, on Kampuchea, we need to keep the US-China-ASEAN consultative process intact. At the same time, should the Chinese show signs of tolerating or cooperating in Soviet behavior harmful to our interests, we should not hesitate to express our concerns to them forcefully and to deliver appropriate warnings.

Improvement in US-China relations will require not only restoring high-level rapport but also managing problem areas, and reduces Beijing's incentives for expanding relations with Moscow. We need to define our long term national security interest with China carefully, weighing export control needs against our interest in strengthening China against Moscow. We must bear in mind also China's strong sensitivity to discriminatory treatment and need for help in its modernization.

US-China defense relations offer a means to reinforce the bilateral relationship and nuture its potential vis-a-vis the USSR. Proceeding too aggressively could backfire however, furthering both Beijing's and Moscow's suspicions that we see China solely as an anti-Soviet weapon. The ball is in Beijing's court on arms sales; we can leave it there while nonetheless pursuing a visit by Secretary Weinberger, which the Chinese have indicated they would welcome.

We must handle unofficial relations with Taiwan carefully, enhancing their substance while avoiding missteps that inflame relations with Beijing and give friends and allies the impression that we are mismanaging this key area.

4. The Middle East. Here it is important that we conduct ourselves in ways which deny the Soviets opportunities for advances. We should show sufficient forward movement --

evacuation of foreign forces from Lebanon and a beginning to broadened autonomy talks -- for us to maintain the support of moderate Arabs and to deter the extremists from becoming instruments of the Soviets. We should, of course, continue to deny the Soviets a role in either the resolution of the Lebanon problem or the peace process. While planning for success regarding Lebanon and Middle East peace, we should also foresee the problems which might be caused by failure. In doing so, we should recognize that if we play our hand correctly, even in failure we should be able to prevent significant Soviet gains in the Middle East. In this regard, the firm positions which we are taking with the Israelis in pursuing our peace effort may give us credibility with the Arabs even if we do not succeed, thus limiting the opportunities for Soviet gains with the moderates.

5. Other areas for sustaining leverage and/or turning up the heat include those touched upon briefly in "I" above: programs directed at Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Nicaragua, southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, etc.

B. There are also possibilities for constructive initiatives or measures we could take in concert with key regional countries. In this connection we should keep in mind that our relevance to the solution of key regional problems, and thus our ability to preempt or counter Soviet actions, is directly related to our ability to develop realistic proposals for progress, consistent with our goals for solutions. We should therefore set forth proposals that cannot be undercut by Soviet initiatives, but that can also serve as the basis for genuinely useful negotiations if the Soviets are interested.

1. Afghanistan: As always, the key to creating and sustaining real Soviet interest in a negotiated settlement is to deny Moscow a victory on the ground. This requires that the Afghan resistance survive and that its capabilities increase over time. This will require some new initiatives on our part taken in concert with the Pakistanis and our other international partners on the Afghanistan question. It is also essential that we intensify our campaign to focus international attention on Soviet abuses in Afghanistan, including chemical weapons use. Should the Soviets step up cross-border attacks on Pakistan, we may have to reaffirm our resolve to support Pakistan's security. Finally, we will have to prevent the Soviets from manipulating the UN negotiating process on Afghanistan to reduce pressure on them for withdrawal. This may require another approach to the UNSYG underscoring our concern that the Cordovez initiative not lend credibility to the Kabul regime and continued close coordination with the Pakistanis who, so far, have remained firm in their objectives in the UN-sponsored talks.

We should consider whether a joint initiative on Afghanistan with Pakistan, China, and possibly the EC could serve our interests. It would be an early way to test the possibilities for positive movement with the Andropov regime, and make somewhat more difficult a further toughening of the Soviet position, e.g. raising troop levels, attacks on Pakistan; it would keep the U.S. in the mainstream of this key issue, and reduce the possibility that Chinese and Pakistani positions on Afghanistan might begin to diverge from ours; if done carefully and in full consultation with the Pakistanis and Chinese, it would provide some additional content for our relations with these countries at a time when this is needed; here and abroad it would show the U.S. as active diplomatically with a positive program vis-a-vis a major irritant in US-Soviet relations. Launching a joint initiative will require considerable effort and may not succeed. But we should attempt to do so as soon as possible -- ideally prior to the Secretary's trip to Beijing. We envisage a package of four substantive elements based on the positions we put on the table during our bilateral talks on Afghanistan with the Soviets last July: phased, complete withdrawal of Soviet forces; transitional arrangements leading to permanent safeguards of Afghanistan as a non-aligned state which is not threatening to its neighbors; self-determination through electoral or traditional means; arrangements for return of refugees.

2. Southern Africa: As our Southern Africa effort moves toward critical choices in the next 3-6 months, it is predictable that Moscow will pursue a two-track approach of (a) publicly berating us for the Angola-Namibia linkage and for stirring up African dismay and Allied nervousness over the possibility of a breakdown, while (b) making careful behind-the-scenes calculation of how we are doing and what degree of compromise will be needed. Moscow will formally reject linkage while indirectly participating, via its influence with Luanda and Havana, in a de facto negotiation.

In these circumstances, it is essential that the U.S. game-plan develop a sense of momentum with the other actors, the Angolans, the South Africans, the front line states, sufficient to convince Moscow that our effort has a real chance to succeed. We should recognize that Moscow is unlikely to come down off its "principled" position on linkage until the pieces of the package are in place -- both to protect itself from the charge of selling out its clients, and to maximize pressures on us. A consistent record of reasonableness -- shared with the MPLA and Moscow -- and a firm reiteration that we cannot be shifted on the Cubans -- will give us the best chance to track Soviet moves and shape the final outlines of a settlement on our terms.

We should be prepared to continue the series of US-Soviet bilateral exchanges on Southern Africa. At a minimum these talks give us the basis for a solid public presentation of who caused failure if the process (or the MPLA) falls short. Proceeding thus will enable us to point out that despite its "principled" position the Soviets were (already are) prepared to consider parallel withdrawal in phase III -- a point which was elliptically conceded by Il'ichev in his recent discussions with Crocker.

3. The Horn. Through our military assistance to Somalia and periodic exercises, we must create the impression in Addis Ababa and Moscow that further aggression against Somalia runs real dangers, including that of greater U.S. involvement. Economic pressure, both direct and indirect, must be maintained on Ethiopia to curb its adventurism. At the same time, we should take advantage of opportunities for dialogue with the Ethiopians to make clear our concerns and the terms on which improved US-Ethiopian relations would be possible. We should consider how we might facilitate a negotiated decrease in border tension. In this connection, we might wish to raise our concerns about developments in the Horn with the Soviets, either in normal diplomatic channels or as a new topic in the US-Soviet sub-ministerial consultations on African issues.

4. Cuban Proxy Problem. This is another possible area for initiative which requires careful and detailed consideration. For example, we could consider making an offer to normalize relations with Havana if they withdrew their forces from Angola and Ethiopia, and ended their destabilizing activities in the Western Hemisphere. This would be a renewal of high-level efforts undertaken in November 1981 and March 1982. If, as is virtually certain, the Cubans and Soviets refused to accept the proposal, it would paint them as the intransigent party and possibly relieve pressures on us from the Europeans and Latin Americans to initiate a "dialogue" with Cuba. To give this project some teeth, we could try simultaneously to sustain pressure on Cuban forces/presence in these areas and in Cuba itself (at the same time, we must recognize the complexity and difficulty of carrying this out).

We must, however, avoid at all costs a "dialogue" such as the one sustained by the last Administration. That dialogue spanned four years but yielded nothing of substance on the major issues dividing the U.S. and Cuba. Today, such a "dialogue" could be used by Cuba to forestall tough U.S. responses to Cuban initiatives and also to undercut the will to resist of governments being destabilized by Cuba.

Soviet control over their Cuban "proxy" is incomplete, and there is the danger that Cuban adventurism could draw the Soviets into an unwanted confrontation with the U.S. Nevertheless, there are areas where we could consider discussing with the USSR the desirability of reduction or withdrawal of Cuban forces (e.g. Africa, the Middle East). In Central America, we need to warn the Soviets of the risks that arms supplies to the area can cause. Most important we need to make them continually aware of the unacceptability of the introduction of Cuban combat forces into this region. This means that we may wish to try to persuade the Soviets to take specific steps of self-restraint or restraint of the Cubans but that no general dialogue on this region is desirable.

III. Specific Steps we Might Take in the US-Soviet Bilateral Relationship

In deciding what steps we might take in US-Soviet bilateral relations, we should be guided by the criteria of U.S. interests set forth in the third section of this study. In particular, we must underscore our insistence that improvements in the bilateral relationship can take place only if the Soviet Union is prepared to exercise restraint in areas of key concern to us. We will also need to judge possibilities for improvement in various areas of the bilateral relationship in the broader context of our strategy for East-West relations. For example, we should not take steps in our bilateral economic relations with the Soviet Union which would complicate our efforts to develop a strong and unified Western position on economic relations with the East. Similarly, we must avoid steps in bilateral arms control negotiations which are inconsistent with necessary force modernization programs or with increased defense cooperation with our Allies.

Within the parameters of these general considerations, there are possibilities in a number of areas of the bilateral relationship.

A. Arms Control

There are a number of arms control initiatives on which we should move forward as soon as possible. These include: (1) renewed effort to reach agreement with the Soviets on the CBMs proposals made by the President November 22; (2) acceleration of interagency work to prepare suggested amendments to the TTBT and PNET; and (3) prompt follow-up to whatever prospects for cooperation might emerge from the current US-Soviet consultations on non-proliferation;

Movement on these issues will not, of course, relieve pressures on us for early progress in INF and START. Indeed, we can expect these pressures to increase significantly in 1983 as INF deployments begin in Europe, the Soviets step up their public carrot-and-stick campaign, and the U.S. debate on defense issues sharpens with the approach of 1984. This paper cannot go into the details of possible initiatives in INF and START. We can note the centrality of arms control in the Soviet view of relations with the U.S. and, more importantly, in the level of confidence among our Allies and in domestic opinion about our ability to manage the US-Soviet relationship. Obviously, any steps we take must advance our security interests.

B. Economic relations

Once we have worked out with our Allies the framework of East-West economic relations envisaged in the November 13 agreement, we can, if Soviet conduct permits in terms of the criteria set forth in Section III of this study, consider how to use our economic relationship to further broader objectives.

In accordance with this overall approach, one way to move while maintaining the balance of our sanctions in place would be to resume government-to-government economic contacts by holding a meeting of the US-Soviet Joint Commercial Commission. A meeting of the Commission scheduled for Washington in April 1980 was cancelled as part of our post-Afghanistan sanctions package. Holding a session of the JCC could lead the Soviets to believe that a range of bilateral economic steps are possible -- including the LTA, resuming negotiations toward a new Maritime Agreement, and the future status of bilateral fisheries arrangements -- without any need for commitments in advance. We would make clear the linkage of further steps to improvement in Soviet conduct. A meeting of the commission could be called for next summer, following the Williamsburg summit. The fact that a commission meeting were scheduled might help us fend off domestic pressures for piecemeal lifting of our sanctions and give us time to pursue our objective of a long-term Alliance agreement on East-West economic relations.

Following a successful JCC session (and only if other, larger objectives were served), we would be in a position to consider moving on several fronts of particular importance to both the Soviets and American economic interests: (1) an LTA; (2) a maritime agreement; (3) resumption of airline service; (4) fishing rights and expansion of the US-Soviet fishing joint venture.

C. US-Soviet Contacts: Process and Presence

Assuming no new Soviet act of aggression, we need to consider how to strengthen our communication with and presence in the Soviet Union. An active diplomatic dialogue, including at least some high-level meetings, can help keep the Soviets engaged on our agenda and maintain Allied and domestic support for our overall East-West strategy, particularly as INF deployments begin in 1983.

1. Substance of the Dialogue

The Soviets will continue to press us for a return to a US-Soviet dialogue centered on arms control. We must continue to resist this tactic and insist that Moscow address the full range of U.S. concerns about Soviet behavior if our relations are to improve. We should continue US-Soviet diplomatic contacts on regional issues, such as Afghanistan and Southern Africa, to keep the pressure of Moscow while making clear that the way to pragmatic solutions lies open.

We could also consider some new avenues for dialogue. One positive thing we have established is that what happens in Poland -- a Warsaw Pact country -- is a matter of serious international concern. We should continue to extend our droit de regard to the old "Soviet sphere" while we continue to oppose its extension in Afghanistan. There might also be some area for useful exchanges in between. For example, we have briefly discussed in high-level tour d'horizon the Iran-Iraq war. We have structured these exchanges to avoid giving Moscow a claim to a greater role in any region, while giving us an opportunity to make clear our strong interest in the independence, territorial integrity, and freedom from external domination of Iran and Iraq. This practice of clarifying with the Soviets our interests and intentions in certain regions might prove useful in other potential areas of crisis, i.e. Southeast Asia.

Another broad area for discussion could be over "means" -- acknowledging that we each believe in political/societal change but in different directions, that we are and will remain essentially competitors, and that the central question is whether support for armed liberation struggles isn't becoming too dangerous for both sides in the nuclear era. We could make clear that there is a general relationship between the growth, necessity for, and level of U.S. programs in these areas and Soviet use of covert action and military force. This is a subject Andropov and Ustinov are particularly well equipped to address either through others or in direct meetings with us. This perhaps could be done in dialogue between non-governmental

people. It probably should not lead to any specific agreements but might result in some tacit, reciprocal understandings.

2. "Process and Presence"

There are three categories of "process and presence":

1. Dialogue on specific issues. We need to go ahead with our talks on non-proliferation, southern Africa, human rights and to get on with some new areas, i.e., TTBT, nuclear CBMs and perhaps CBW.

2. Enhanced presence and the means to get to the Soviet population are key to enhanced influence. We need to look seriously at consulates in Kiev and Tashkent to give some meaning to our more active nationalities policy -- the Ukraine and Central Asia are the largest and potentially most dynamic areas of the Soviet empire. We also should review how to gain both greater presence and greater reciprocity through exchanges and particularly exhibits. Exchanges have the potential for opening key segments of Soviet society to Western influence; unless we move in this area, we will not be able to enforce reciprocity (as the Soviets make separate arrangements with private U.S. sponsors, while denying us reciprocal access to the USSR). Exhibits are, next to the radios, the most powerful tool we have had to influence Soviet citizens, but are now absent from our arsenal because we unilaterally decided not to proceed with a new cultural agreement. The strengthening of the radios themselves must proceed in accordance with approved Presidential guidance. And finally, our overall ideological/political action offensive must move ahead.

3. Higher-level meetings are important to maintaining the kind of balanced dialogue we seek and to determining how far the Soviets are prepared to go to meet our concerns.

Over the first six months of 1983, we would envision:

a. Meetings between Hartman and Korniyenko/Gromyko in Moscow, and with Dobrynin here in Washington. One objective would be to determine whether and when another meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko makes sense.

b. Another Shultz-Gromyko meeting before the regular one at the fall UNGA.

One important topic which the US-Soviet dialogue will inevitably address is the possibility of a summit. Contributing to pressures on us for a summit will be the likely series of

pilgrimages to Moscow by West European leaders to establish a "dialogue" with Andropov; there might even be a Sino-Soviet summit meeting if present trends continue. In order to sustain Allied cooperation with INF deployments it may become necessary during 1983 to demonstrate that we have taken advantage of every opportunity-- including that afforded by a summit -- to reach an acceptable INF agreement with Moscow.

In addition to these considerations, a summit could serve our substantive and political interests by demonstrating to Western publics that we and the Russians are actually talking to one another. We could also use the preparations for a summit to keep the Soviets engaged in a comprehensive dialogue which addresses seriously arms control, regional issues, and bilateral issues. Preparation for a summit could conceivably encourage the Soviets to make some symbolic Soviet concessions on human rights. (though this has a down-side as well, i.e. some in the U.S. will argue for substantive responses to these relatively cost-free-to-the-Soviets steps).

At the same time, there are a number of potential drawbacks: a summit would suggest that US-Soviet relations were better than is in fact the case, and would stimulate unilateral European initiatives toward Moscow. The results of an early summit meeting are likely to be meager at best, certainly nothing more than minor agreements such as on confidence-building measures, if that. Moreover, there is a risk that an early summit could be a bitter encounter, with Soviet intransigence leading to pressure for more confrontational U.S. policies.

We could try to avoid these pitfalls by lowering our own and the public's expectations with regard to a summit -- although that would be no easy task. We should try to move our public line away from emphasis on the need for "positive results" to the theme that a summit should be "carefully prepared". Such an approach would attempt to demystify the whole summit question, and seek to minimize the danger that the lack of concrete results would be interpreted as a "crisis" in the US-Soviet relationship.

Another possible way to make them lower key and more routine would be to establish the principle of annual summits -- this clearly requires consideration. But altering public expectations will be very difficult no matter what we do. Another question we would need to answer is whether we could control the pressure for substantive results once summit preparations were in train. (One means of lowering expectations would be to arrange a summit on the margins of some other event, e.g., an Andropov visit to the UNGA. Such a summit could be more of a "get-acquainted" session, but it is difficult to predict

whether the opportunity for such a chance encounter will occur in the coming year.)

If we conclude that a summit would be in our interest, the timing of such a meeting would become a critical question. We should not appear over-eager for a summit and should especially avoid being placed in the position of demandeur. On the other hand, if a large number of our Allies seek early meetings with Andropov, this could argue for an early US-Soviet summit, perhaps in late spring, after the Williamsburg Summit (a spring meeting could give INF a needed boost at a time when public opposition to deployments will be reaching a crescendo).

Although no final decisions on a summit are required now, we should begin serious consideration of how best to gain control of this issue and use it to further U.S. interests.

Task IV

U.S. POLICY: POSSIBLE ACTIONS/INITIATIVES